The idea that we are living in a computer simulation was popularized by the motion picture The Matrix in 1999. A more rigorous formulation was made by Philosopher Nick Bostrom in 2003 in his paper Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? and is known by the name the Simulation Hypothesis. It is not a direct claim that we **are** living in a simulation, but rather a probabilistic argument.
If it becomes possible to simulate entire conscious beings and environments (which might be feasible in the distant future given advances in computing power), then technologically advanced civilizations could run many such simulations. If many such simulations exist, then the number of simulated beings would vastly outnumber the number of real, original beings. Therefore, if we assume that we are not in a special or privileged position, it becomes statistically likely that we are one of the simulated minds.
There has been some criticism of this hypothesis however. Some scholars view it as a philosophically intriguing challenge to our assumptions about consciousness, computation, and metaphysics. Some argue that the hypothesis relies on unverifiable assumptions, such as the computational nature of consciousness or the behavior of future civilizations. Others consider it a modern version of Descartes’ evil demon. In his *Meditations on First Philosophy* from 1641, Descartes proposed the idea of an evil demon, a powerful, malevolent being who deceives our senses and thoughts. This was a thought experiment meant to question the reliability of sense perception and the certainty of knowledge. Descartes used it to reach his foundational claim “Cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am).
In his 2003 article “The Matrix as Metaphysics” David Chalmers argues that the Simulation Hypothesis functions similarly to the evil demon, but replaces it with a technologically advanced machine. The core idea remains: the reality we experience might not correspond to actual, external reality, but rather be a deception—either deliberate (as in *The Matrix*) or incidental (as in a simulation run by posthuman scientists). Consequently, it is equally likely that we are living in a simulation and that we are in the thralls of an evil demon. This argument however, only shows that it is equally likely as another hypothesis, not the philosophical merits.
The simulation hypothesis posits that there is something more real behind apparent reality, which explains the existence of the reality that we perceive.
Descartes formulated a theory of mind and perception that stipulated that the mind was immaterial and relied on mechanical processes that relayed senses to this non-material mind which then interprets the idea. He used metaphors such as the mind was viewing images projected by the workings of the brain, like a theater, hence the name Cartesian Theater. This later came to be known as the Homunculus fallacy. Homunculus means little human. The issue is that what Descartes tried to explain, mind and perception, is replaced by mechanics and another entity, the non-material mind, which works like a smaller human, because how then does the non-material mind perceive and think? Is there another homunculus inside? and if yes what about that homunculus?
In philosophical terms this is called an infinite regress. An infinite regress happens when:
- A phenomenon A is explained by B,
- B must be explained by C,
- C must be explained by D, and so on—without end.
Unless this chain terminates in a self-sufficient explanation or foundation, it is considered problematic because it never actually explains anything completely.
Now we can see the similarity to the simulation theory. Where Descartes moved the seat of mind perception inwards to a homunculus being a spectator of a cartesian theater in an infinite regress, the simulation theory moves it outside by posting another reality creating this reality. That might be a simulation in another higher reality until we get to base reality. But base reality has the same problem, how is this different and what is it? The simulation theory is therefore an inverse Cartesian theater that leads to infinite regress.
Infinite regress is used as a way to assess the merits of a theory: if a theory leads to an infinite regress, it may indicate a need for a better or more fundamental explanation. There are different ways to deal with infinite regress.
One way is foundationalism, where the core idea is assumed to be self justifying and foundational. They are simply assumed to be correct. Descartes himself took that stance in his famous “Cogito ergo sum”, which he took to be the foundational self evident truth. Other philosophical traditions who take the same approach are the abrahamic religions, which emphasise a foundational belief in God, similarly because it is self-evidently true. By this approach believing in the Simulation Theory is no different than believing in a religion. The problem is therefore that it is difficult to justify the belief.
Another way to justify an infinite regress is coherentism, which instead asserts that the hypothesis is justified rather by how well it coheres with other observations, which mutually supports the theory. This is in fact the more common approach. Some physicists and computer scientists (e.g. Silas Beane, James Gates) have speculated that anomalies in physical laws or mathematical patterns might suggest computational underpinnings. The problem here is that it is perfectly possible for a theory to be entirely false because it is self referential and may have no relation to reality. Many conspiracy theories also follow this pattern by pointing to chains of self referential assumptions and observations.
Infinitism is another approach to infinite regress. It simply posits that infinite chains are acceptable. as long as the chain does not refer to itself. In the simulation theory this would amount to asserting that there is, in fact, no base reality. There are only infinite layers of simulation. Basically that amounts to saying that there is no reality or that we cannot understand it (because we cannot process infinity).
The simulation hypothesis is therefore either a theory similar to a religion, a self referential system which there is no way to know if true or ultimately unknowable. It is certainly a possibility, but there is no good philosophical reason to assume that it is any better than the world’s religions or conspiracy theories. The popularity is therefore more a testament to the contemporary ubiquity of computation than any rigorous philosophical basis. In Descartes times demons were more common.
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